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Abstract Virtue ethics is often proposed as a third way in health-care ethics, that
while consequentialism and deontology focus on action guidelines,
virtue focuses on character; all three aim to help agents discern morally
right action although virtue seems to have least to contribute to political
issues, such as austerity. I claim: (1) This is a bad way to characterize
virtue ethics. The 20th century renaissance of virtue ethics was first
proposed as a response to the difficulty of making sense of ‘moral right-
ness’ outside a religious context. For Aristotle the right action is that
which is practically best; that means best for the agent in order to live a
flourishing life.There are no moral considerations besides this. (2) Prop-
erly characterized, virtue ethics can contribute to discussion of austerity.
A criticism of virtue ethics is that fixed characteristics seem a bad idea in
ever-changing environments; perhaps we should be generous in prosper-
ity, selfish in austerity. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that
people indeed do change with their environment. However, I argue that
virtues concern fixed values not fixed behaviour; the values underlying
virtue allow for different behaviour in different circumstances: in auster-
ity, virtues still give the agent the best chance of flourishing. Two ques-
tions arise. (a) In austere environments might not injustice help an
individual flourish by, say, obtaining material goods? No, because unjust
acts undermine the type of society the agent needs for flourishing. (b)
What good is virtue to those lacking the other means to flourish? The
notion of degrees of flourishing shows that most people would benefit
somewhat from virtue. However, in extreme circumstances virtue might
harm rather than benefit the agent: such circumstances are to be
avoided; virtue ethics thus has a political agenda to enable flourishing.
This requires justice, a fortiori when in austerity.
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Introduction
In the literature on health-care ethics, the virtue
approach is sometimes presented as a third way
between consequentialism and deontology, the latter
approaches focusing on the act, the virtue approach on
the agent. Implied is that all three share the same goal,
to help the professional do the morally right thing.
Thus characterized the virtue approach would seem to
have least of the three to say about austerity as this
raises issues about justice and distribution,not charac-
ter. In this paper I make two claims that: (1) this is a
poor representation of the virtue approach and (2)
austerity raises issues to which a genuine virtue
approach can make useful contributions.The paper is
presented in two main sections based on the claims.
Claim 1 – virtue ethics is not a third
way in moral philosophy
The reappearance of virtue in moral philosophy is
usually traced back to the paper ‘Modern Moral Phi-
losophy’ byAnscombe (1958). Her call for a return to
the approach found in Aristotle and Plato was taken
up in the theoretical realm by inter alia Foot (1978),
Geach (1977), Irwin (1990) andMacintyre (2007), and
in the practical realm of health-care ethics by many
others (Hursthouse, 1987; Gardiner, 2003; Bolsin
et al., 2005;Armstrong, 2006;Hodkinson, 2008). In the
practical realm, the task of virtue ethics is taken to be
that of other approaches, such as consequentialism
and deontology, that is, to help practitioners with dif-
ficult ethical decisions in practice, such as abortion,
truth telling, and whistleblowing. In this task, virtue is
taken as providing either an alternative approach
(Hursthouse, 1987; Armstrong, 2006) or a comple-
mentary one (Beauchamp & Childress, 2008). In the
first, the virtues enable the agent to discern the right
action while other theories do not help; in the second,
the virtues enable the agent correctly to apply the
other theories. Both versions appeal to some nurse
theorists as they seem to imply the virtuous agent has
a tacit or intuitive expertise (practical wisdom)
similar to that which the expert nurse is said to have
in, for example, Benner’s approach (Benner, 1997,
2000).
Viewed as this third way in ethics, the virtue
approach, particularly the alternative account, seems
circular; the right action is what the virtuous agent
would do, and the virtuous agent would do the right
action. And in discussion of practical issues, this cir-
cularity manifests as it-depends answers: is abortion
wrong – it depends; is lying to patients wrong – it
depends; and so on. The practitioner is referred back
to what the virtuous agent would do, and that cannot
be inferred outside the specific situation. In an article
for this journal,Holland expresses well the frustration
of the practitioner; any nurse who defended a particu-
lar act on the basis either that she has years of expe-
rience or intuitively knows what is right would get
short shrift (Holland, 2010).
This is not to decry the notions of expertise, intu-
ition, and practical wisdom. An art expert might be
able instantly to recognize a fake; an art buyer would
do well to follow her advice. But at the heart of this
advice is an agreed definition of the work as either
fake or not.And although the expert made her judge-
ment instantaneously and may credit her intuition,
asked to give reasons for the judgement she could
provide them. This is unlike the situation with issues
in health-care ethics. There is no widely agreed defi-
nition of moral rightness and a fortiori no agreement
on who is expert in judging it. Faced with practical
problems in health-care ethics the practitioner can
draw upon act-based approaches that at least provide
some equipment with which to make judgements; in
contrast, the virtue approach, and other character-
based approaches, such as the ethics of care, offer the
will-o-the-wisp person who somehow knows.
The temptation to characterize virtue ethics as this
third type of moral philosophy is reinforced by the
fact that for modern readers the terms ‘virtue’ and,
particularly ‘moral virtue’ (the usual translations for
Aristotle’s aret and aret eqik) imply moral
goodness. Reading Aristotle this way it seems that he
has fixed it so that magically it turns out that the good
life for all is also and only the life of a morally good
human; doing well requires being good. This conclu-
sion runs against the apparently obvious fact that,
Some people live in hell, many bastards succeed (Michael
Gira: lyrics to ‘Failure’ by The Swans)
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So there are two issues here: first, why Aristotle
seems to conflate living a morally good life with a
personally flourishing one and, second, how this
account can survive in the face of the fact that virtues
are not always and perhaps not often associated with
a life we could describe as flourishing, happy or any
such thing.
Tackling the first issue takes us back to Anscombe
and those who followed, particularly Macintyre and
Foot (Foot, 1978; MacIntyre, 2007). In brief, the story
they tell is ofAristotelian and Stoic concepts of virtue
being adopted in the post-Roman world by the
nascent Christian one. Here they became grounded
not in the notion of individual flourishing but in that
of law-like injunctions given by God; doing the right
thing became not right-for-me but, rather, right-by-
God. This neatly resolved a central problem for the
classical philosophers: how to incorporate justice into
the virtue account of living well. Justice had been
condemned by Glaucon as good for another:
[No] man thinks justice pays him personally, since he will
always do wrong when he gets the chance. Plato Republic
360c. (Plato, 1987)
In response, Plato,Aristotle, and others struggled to
fit acting in accord with justice into a personally flour-
ishing life; the idea that being unjust to another
damaged the unjust person more than the wronged
one seemed as strange to many Greeks as to us. On
the Christian account, justice is one of God’s injunc-
tions to us; the rewards for justice, and the final right-
ing of wrongs, come after death. The apparent
flourishing of the unjust in the here-and-now is of
little matter in the face of eternal damnation or
reward.
What Macintyre terms ‘the Enlightenment project’
is the attempt to give these law-like injunctions a
secular basis; the paradigm example, Kant, terms the
injunctions of law-like ethics the ‘categorical impera-
tive’ and attempts to show that they can be derived
from reason. Anscombe’s starting point is that this
project has failed; we have inherited law-like morality
but have failed to find a non-religious grounding for
it. Her call for a return to the ethics of Aristotle is not
in the belief that this will complete the Enlightenment
project but rather that it will replace it with a politics
and ethics based on the idea of human flourishing.
Thus, the reason the Nicomachean Ethics can seem to
us like a book of moral philosophy, an attempt to
complete the Enlightenment project, is because the
language of virtue has been absorbed into the lan-
guage of law-like morality. To make sense of Aristot-
le’s ethics we must distil theAristotelian essence from
this Enlightenment brew:
It is important that our account of flourishing and good
fortune be uncontaminated with contemporary thoughts of
morality. (Coope, 2006, p. 24)
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is more like a
work of modern self-help than modern moral phi-
losophy: How to live well not How to be good. His
work that has subsequently been termed ‘ethics’ and
‘politics’ he terms the ‘philosophy of human affairs’
(NE 1181b). Linked to his other work, such as his
biology, Aristotle is providing an account of what it
is for creatures like us to live well, to live success-
fully. In brief, his answer is that we need the virtues,
such as temperance and courage, and we also need
some good fortune to avoid external events such as
disease, earthquakes, and wars, that can damage or
destroy a flourishing life. Good fortune is also
needed to give the individual a chance of developing
virtue in the first place – both the circumstances of
birth and the potentials with which people are born
are outside their control.
Having set out the argument for the claim that
Aristotle’s virtue ethics should not be seen as a third
type of moral philosophy, we are faced with the
second issue, the thought that Aristotle’s belief in
human flourishing consisting of acting virtuously is
implausible.We shall tackle this issue through devel-
oping the second main claim of this paper, that aus-
terity raises issues to which a genuine virtue approach
can make useful contributions.
Claim 2 – austerity raises issues to
which virtue ethics can make a
useful contribution
In the wet, cacti wilt and fungi flourish. For any
species an austere environment is roughly one in
which some of its members can survive but few can
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flourish. Some species are ill-equipped to survive in
any but the most specific of circumstances; for these,
such as Giant Pandas, the environment is either con-
ducive to flourishing or positively hostile – there are
no grades of austerity. By contrast, humans are adapt-
able; we can survive in many environments. Of these,
some are more or less austere, a few flourish or many
flourish.And this raises the issue we touched upon at
the end of the previous section.Virtues are firm states
of character; for example, someone who is courageous
will always be so. And, claims Aristotle, those with
virtues are most likely to flourish. The experience of
austerity, however, seems to show otherwise; to flour-
ish, humans need to be adaptable.
Furthermore, humans are indeed adaptable: gener-
ous when they can afford to be; kind when it is easy;
selfish when required. John Doris argues that it is the
environment that primarily determines our choices,
not our character (Doris, 2002). Numerous experi-
ments in social psychology show this. To take one
amusing example, students on a seminary for study of
religious education were told to give a short talk, half
of them on the story of the Good Samaritan, the other
half on a topic unrelated to helping (Darley &Batson,
1973). They were set up so that on their way they
would come upon someone needing help, a man
slumped in an alleyway. Some of the students were
told they were early, some, just on time, others, that
they were late. The likelihood of stopping to help
correlated along these lines; the early students
stopped to help, the late ones did not.The topic of the
proposed talk made no difference. Thus overall, it is
said, not only is the link between virtue and flourish-
ing implausible, but also, human behaviour reflects
this. In different environments people should behave
differently in order to flourish, and in fact they do.
How might an Aristotelian respond?
One problem with Doris’s critique is that he fixes
behaviour too tightly to character types, such as
courage. In the Good Samaritan experiment, he takes
it that those in a hurry who pass by do not have the
virtue of charity and, therefore, it is likely that those
who have plenty of time and who stop probably do
not have it either. But it is not obvious that possession
of the virtue of charity would result in someone’s
stopping to help. Those who pass by might feel a
strong sense of duty1 to deliver the lecture to the
waiting students.While they would stop to save some-
one’s life, they would, under pressure of time, pass by
someone who may simply be drunk. Virtue is not
evinced by particular action types but rather in the
values underlying it, the reason the action is chosen. It
is not an act of charity to disappoint the waiting con-
gregation unless the cause is worthwhile. In this
example, the students may have judged it was not.
To threaten the virtue account of flourishing, Doris
would need to show, first, that people do not have or
act upon established values and, second, that people
would not do well to have or act upon certain (virtu-
ous) established values. He does not do this; indeed,
his commentary on the experiments reveals a belief
that people are consistent in one respect, that they do
what they perceive to be in their best interest; stealing
when able to get away with it, and so forth. Aristotle
would agree that this is what people do.He would not
accept, however, that people’s vision of their own best
interest is always correct. The virtuous agent has a
consistent vision of her best interest from which her
behaviour reliably follows; called upon to risk her
well-being in a worthwhile cause, she will do so. In
other circumstances she will not risk her well-being.
Doris falsely infers that this irregularity in behaviour
(taking risks only sometimes) shows the agent to be
inconsistent whereas, in fact, she is consistent in her
vision and values and, therefore, her action.
This takes us part way to rebutting the criticism that
people need to be adaptable if they are to flourish.We
can say that consistent values will result in different
choices for different situations: for example, taking a
risk in one situation but not another. But there is
further to go.Recall that we are now operating within
an Aristotelian practical philosophy concerned not
with moral rightness but rather rightness in relation to
human flourishing. Even on the account given so far,
which allows for adaptable and flexible behaviour
grounded in stable values, the problem remains that
1The term ‘Duty’ sounds law-like and out of line with the argu-
ment in the previous section. Buckle (2002) shows how the
notion of law is compatible with and central to the account of
ethics and politics based on flourishing. I ask the reader to accept
this ad hominem.
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non-virtuous agents seem to flourish. This problem
has two aspects.The first is thatAristotle put justice to
the fore; in our relations with others, justice is
complete virtue . . . For this reason, it is often held that
justice is the greatest of the virtue, and that ‘neither evening
star nor morning star is such a wonder’ (Aristotle, 2000)
(1129b).
But because it concerns our relationship with
others more obviously than, say, temperance and
courage, it is far from clear that justice serves the
individual well.The second aspect is that fate seems to
play a large role in flourishing such that many people
would not flourish even if they were virtuous.
One way round both aspects of the problem is to
say that common ideas of flourishing are almost com-
pletely wrong. This is the route taken by the Stoics.
Like most classical writers on ethics and flourishing
the Stoics were much exercised with the problem of
fate (Annas, 1995). In our common ideas, flourishing
can be undermined even late in life. Someone who
appears happy, comfortable, and virtuous might be
undermined by illness (her own or in those she loves),
a child going ‘off the rails’, even a house fire. The
Stoics give an account of flourishing in which it can be
attributed only to someone who has rendered himself
untouchable by fate. The Stoic virtuous agent meets
good fortune or bad with the same, Stoic, indifference;
he would be happy even being tortured (NE 1153b).
This indifferent state they termed ataraxia; it has been
compared to the state aimed at through Buddhist
meditation (Coseru, 2007). While this account suc-
cessfully navigates the problem of fate, it does so at
the expense of being unlike anything most would rec-
ognize as a flourishing life. In particular, being indif-
ferent seems to take away much possibility of
enjoying life, and enjoyment seems to be crucially
important for a flourishing life. For example, parents’
pleasure in the development of their children is based
in caring deeply for them; this leaves them exposed to
terrible pain if things go wrong; but without such deep
caring, their lives would look hollow to most observ-
ers. This is illustrated in the alleged (but most likely
untrue) response of a Stoic father, Anaxagoras, to
news of his son’s death,
I was aware that it was a mortal I had begotten. (Freeman,
1935, p. 73)
By contrast,Aristotle’s account of flourishing is rec-
ognizable and worldly. And most of the virtues of
intellect (such as intelligence) and character (such as
courage) are plausibly helpful to live a good life. It
seems that in most circumstances a clever and coura-
geous person will fare better than someone lacking
intelligence or racked by anxiety. Aristotle’s account
is also recognizable in that he takes it that a flourish-
ing life is one that is pleasurable or enjoyable. His
account, however, is susceptible to the problems of
justice and fate.
As stated above, the problem of justice seeming to
be another person’s good rather than that of the just
individual was well known to Aristotle. Aristotelians
writing since Anscombe’s paper have often given a
naturalist account of virtue and flourishing in which
justice is more a virtue for the species than the indi-
vidual (MacIntyre, 1999; Foot, 2001). As social, ratio-
nal, dependent animals, justice gives all humans in a
society the best chance of flourishing.The problem of
an individual benefiting from being unjust can thus be
seen as a version of the prisoner’s dilemma; we would
all do best to be just but if others are unjust it might
serve me best to be unjust too. Thus in terms of my
individual best interest the reason I have to be just is
a collective one: I benefit if I live in a society in which
justice prevails; my acting justly contributes to this;
therefore I do well to act justly.
At first glance, this response to the problem of
justice seems not watertight; in an otherwise wholly
just society might not the unjust person flourish?
However, Aristotle’s oft-cited belief (from Politics
1252b30) that man is a social or political animal is
important here. It means that part of his answer to the
old question, ‘How should I live?’ is ‘. . . in a flourish-
ing society’. In order for such a society to prevail,
justice must prevail. Unjust acts undermine this and
thus undermine the individual’s own flourishing. This
is not merely because of abstract sympathy for those
suffering injustice.As social animals we have concern
for others who also rely on justice: family, friends, and
so on.An unjust act might help us, say, obtain material
goods but it threatens the well-being of those we care
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about and therefore ours (Buckle, 2002). If the unjust
person has no concerns for others then he is not flour-
ishing as a social being anyway.
Turning to the problem of fate, it manifests in dif-
ferent ways: people can be rendered unable to live
flourishing lives by inter alia illness, lacking sufficient
intelligence, living in an unjust society, living without
sufficient material wealth. Arius Didymus provides a
useful tripartite categorization of goods here: goods
of the body and of the soul, and external goods
(Didymus & Simpson, 2010). The goods of the soul
are the moral (the term here denoting character) and
intellectual virtues, the goods of the body are physical
virtues, such as strength and health, and external
goods are such things as good rulers and material
wealth. In Aristotelian style he defines flourishing or
happiness as virtuous activity ‘furnished with the
equipment you would pray for’. He goes on,
[The] virtuous man would also use virtue well amid evils,
though he will not be blest, and since he would be displaying
his noble breeding amid injuries, though he be not happy
. . . [happiness] does not mean bearing up amid things ter-
rible but enjoying good things along with preserving justice
in community as well and not depriving itself of the beauties
of study or of the necessities of life. [132.8]
Arius thus gives us a variety of ways in which we
can fall short of flourishing: lacking goods of the body,
of the soul, external things, or a combination. For
argument’s sake here we shall group body and exter-
nal goods together as ‘external’. A virtuous person
can be ill, ugly, and poor; a vicious one, healthy, hand-
some, and rich. Both, it would seem, are in a state
below complete flourishing and happiness but above
that of complete destitution of body and soul; they are
in an intermediate state. What reason has either to
remain or become virtuous? Perhaps the virtuous
agent should give up on, say, justice, and take to steal-
ing to supplement his external goods. Thuswise he
might lose his goods of the soul but get in return
external goods. And the vicious agent is already in
that position; what has he to gain from virtue, particu-
larly if his vices are what got him external goods such
as wealth in the first place?
In a naturalist account, our response to these ques-
tions can be partly empirical. We see examples of
good people whose lives are blighted with misfortune,
whose goodness has enabled them to maintain their
sense of dignity,worth, pride, and self-esteem. It might
also help people keep their sanity. I do not seek to
break the link between enjoyment and flourishing
here; rather I take it that such things as dignity and
worth result from or consist in enjoyment or pleasure
that can provide some compensation for misfortune.2
Of non-virtuous agents blessed with good fortune, we
might suggest that lacking goods of the soul risks the
other goods; the clearest example is the way intem-
perance harms health. Although less obvious, I have
suggested also that injustice harms the unjust person
because it undermines the social fabric on which his
well-being depends qua rational social animal.
This gives us an outline account of why unfortunate
virtuous people should remain virtuous and why for-
tunate non-virtuous people risk losing their interme-
diate happiness. There remains the question of what
people should do in environments in which vice
improves your chance of being in the intermediate
state rather than in a state of total destitution or
death. Although the vicious agent in a bad environ-
ment will not flourish, he will fare better than the
virtuous one.
One response to this would be to ask whether such
environments are likely to be common. It would need
to be one in which clever and talented people would
do better to cultivate vice than virtue – given vice’s
potential to harm personal health and friendship this
seems counterintuitive. But granted its possibility
what this amounts to is saying that some environ-
ments are so bad for humans that flourishing is out of
the question and the best chance of survival lies in the
development of traits that run against rational, social
nature as, for example, selfishness does. An Aristote-
2Diane Lamplugh, mother of the (presumed) murdered estate
agent Suzy Lamplugh, went on to become an expert in the issue
of people who disappear and to found the charity, the Suzy
LamplughTrust, which helped set up guidelines on lone-working
with which many health workers are familiar.By all accounts, she
was a good person both before and after her daughter disap-
peared. She died on 18 August 2011. Unfortunately, it seems
wrong to describe her life as happy or flourishing but her chari-
table work plausibly provided some compensation.
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lian should grant this possibility. One implication is
that individuals should act in order to avoid or to alter
such systems; Aristotle’s ethics thus has political
implications.
I began this section with the claim that austerity
raises issues to which virtue ethics can make a useful
contribution. These issues concern the relationship
between virtue, the environment, and human flourish-
ing. I offered a rebuttal of the criticism that flexibility
rather than virtue is required for humans to flourish in
changing environments. From this basis I suggested
that some environments are more or less conducive to
flourishing. Austere environments are relatively non-
conducive.We tend to think of austerity in economic
terms, but a child growing up in an environment that
is wealthy but short of parental love faces austerity.
Thus it is reasonable to talk of degrees of flourishing
in people’s lives; the child without parental love may
go on to flourish but it would have been better had he
known love when young; people in prosperous but
acquisitive societies will find it hard to develop the
virtue of justice and thus to flourish. Similarly, illness
is never welcome but possession of virtue enables
people to fare better in its presence.However, certain
environments make flourishing impossible. Severe
mental illness provides an example, living in a terribly
unjust society another. In some such cases the indi-
vidual might be better served by vice rather than
virtue: for example, willing to sacrifice others to
survive. Such situations are wholly unfortunate and to
be avoided if humans are to flourish.
Conclusion
In years of abundance, most of the young people have the
wherewithal to be good, whereas in years of adversity, most
of them become violent. This is not a matter of a difference
in the capacities sent down by Heaven but rather of what
overwhelms their minds. Mengzi. (Chinese Confucian Phi-
losopher, 4th century BC, cited in Bloom, 2002, p. 83)
Virtue ethics can sound priggish and absurd when
used as a form of Enlightenment moral philosophy.
We are to emulate super-humans who both know
what is morally right and desire above everything to
bring it about. Stripped of this, however, it is a prac-
tical philosophy with political implications (Buckle,
2002). Aristotle makes clear that his Ethics is part of
an overall practical philosophy that includes politics.
Humans are social animals; it follows that an account
of human flourishing is also an account of social flour-
ishing.The point Mengzi makes (above) is that people
make environments and are made by them; if the
environment is hostile to flourishing, agents are
unlikely to develop the personal characteristics
needed or the social environment needed for
flourishing.
In this regard, recent work by Nussbaum and others
is useful (Nussbaum, 2006).This grounds the language
of human rights in flourishing as individuals and as
societies; we have the right to live the best life pos-
sible with the capacities we have as individuals and
the resources we have as a society; social systems are
just to the extent that they enable this. To this point,
approaches such as Nussbaum’s have primarily been
applied to broad political concerns, such as famine,
rather than to the specific area of health-care decision
making; but the field is opening up to include appli-
cation to health and health-care ethics (Anand, 2005;
Mitra, 2006; Coast et al., 2008). As practitioners in
health care, we would do well to view health-care
ethics as enmeshed with a concern with flourishing
rather than morality.
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